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Abstract
Because of low harvest prices over the last three years, several congressmen and agricultural advisors are
calling for increased government involvement in grain stock management in the belief that the government
should remove grain from the market when prices are low and return it to the market when prices recover.
Proposals for government involvement run from a simple extension of the loan period to the establishment of
a new Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR) program, whereby the government subsidizes long-term storage of
grain. To gain insight into whether government involvement in grain markets should increase, the authors
discuss various lessons that can be learned from past FOR operations.
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TIME FOR A NEW FARMER-OWNED RESERVE? 
 
he current farm program contains a marketing loan program that offers grain farmers 
two options at harvest time to counter low market prices. Farmers can either take a 
loan deficiency payment (LDP) on harvested production, or farmers can place production 
“under loan.” The LDP pays the farmer the difference between the loan rate and a 
government-calculated price (the posted county price), which changes daily. Once the 
LDP has been taken the farmer can either market the crop or store it, but all further 
government assistance is ended. A farmer who puts the crop under loan stores the crop 
and receives a loan from the government. If the market price rises above the loan rate, the 
farmer can pay off the loan, market the crop, and pocket the difference. If the price does 
not rise above the loan rate, the farmer can pay off the loan at the posted county price, 
which is equivalent to receiving an LDP. The farmer must repay the loan within nine 
months or choose to forfeit the stored crop to the government.  
 
The current marketing-loan program 
is designed to ensure that government 
responsibility for a crop ends before the 
next crop is harvested. Congress largely 
removed the government from grain 
stock management to avoid a large 
buildup of stocks during times of weak 
prices. Private stockholding may 
increase during times of weak prices, but 
government stockholding may not.  
 
Because of the low harvest prices 
over the last three years, several 
congressmen and agricultural advisors 
are calling for increased government 
involvement in grain stock management 
in the belief that the government should 
remove grain from the market when 
prices are low and return it to the market 
when prices recover. Proposals for 
government involvement run from a 
simple extension of the loan period to 
the establishment of a new Farmer-
Owned Reserve (FOR) program, 
whereby the government subsidizes  
 
long-term storage of grain. To gain 
insight into whether government  
involvement should increase, this 
briefing paper looks back at how the 
FOR operated and discusses the lessons 
learned from its operation.  
 
The History of the 
Farmer-Owned Reserve 
The original FOR was a loan program 
designed to hold production out of 
commodity markets during times of low 
prices while still leaving the production 
under producer control. The program 
began in 1977 and was terminated in 
1996 with the passage of the Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform 
(FAIR) Act. The policy objectives of the 
FOR were to 
1. assure that stocks of grain would 
be available in times of low 
production, and  
2. reduce grain price variability.  
T 
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A reduction in variability means stronger 
prices during times of high production 
and weaker prices in short-crop years. 
 
To participate in the FOR, 
producers were required to enter into a 
three-year reserve agreement with the 
government. Under the agreement, 
producers received a nonrecourse 
commodity loan with the possibility of 
deferred interest and storage cost 
reimbursement in exchange for some 
restrictions on the timing of grain 
removal from the reserve. The FOR 
program was available to producers of 
wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, and 
rice. 
 
The original FOR was structured 
around three prices: the loan rate, release 
price, and call price. In most years, the 
FOR loan rate was the same as the 
regular commodity loan rate. Grain in 
the FOR could not be sold without 
penalty unless the loan was repaid and 
the average market price for the 
commodity exceeded the release price. 
The call price set the average market 
price level at which the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
could require the repayment of loans. 
After 1981, there was no set call price 
but the USDA had the discretion to force 
repayment of loans under emergency 
conditions. With the 1990 farm bill, the 
release price was also eliminated so 
producers could move grain out of the 
FOR without penalty. 
 
When market prices exceeded the 
release price, the FOR was in release 
status and remained so until the month 
after the national average market price 
fell below the release price. While the 
FOR was in release status, producers in 
the FOR were charged interest on the 
loans and storage payments were 
discontinued. However, producers were 
allowed to repay their loans and interest 
charges and remove grain from the FOR 
without penalty. 
 
The FOR would be in call status 
when the national average market price 
exceeded the call price for five 
consecutive days. The USDA could also 
put the FOR in call status when “the 
secretary determined that emergency 
conditions exist which require that such 
commodities must be made available in 
the market to meet urgent domestic and 
international needs.” If the FOR was put 
in call status, producers would be 
required to repay their loans and interest 
charges or forfeit their grain as payment. 
 
Storage payments were made to 
producers in the FOR when the average 
market price did not exceed the release 
price. For corn and wheat producers, the 
annual payments were $0.25/bushel 
from 1977 to 1979. In 1980, the storage 
payments increased to $0.265/bushel for 
both crops. The addition (or withdrawal) 
of storage payments was used to induce 
participation in (or withdrawal from) the 
FOR.  
 
The loans made under the FOR 
could carry interest charges. Typically, 
interest was charged only on the first 
year of the loan. Interest charges also 
were waived for special instances such 
as the 1980 grain embargo of the Soviet 
Union. The USDA had the authority to 
charge interest over the entire length of 
the loan and to change interest rates in 
any year, if necessary. 
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The penalties for removal of grain 
from the FOR when prices were not 
above the release price included the 
repayment of the loan and interest, 
return of unearned storage payments, 
and a charge equal to one-half of the 
product of the annual loan interest rate 
and the original loan amount. The call 
and release price structure combined 
with the penalties for early withdrawal 
served to control the flow of grain on the 
market. 
 
The 1990 farm bill contained the 
last major adjustments to the FOR. It 
required that producers enroll in the 
regular marketing loan program for the 
full nine months before they could 
obtain a FOR loan. Interest was charged 
when the national average market price 
rose above 105 percent of the loan rate 
and would continue to be charged for 90 
days after the last day the market price 
equaled or exceeded this level. When the 
average market price exceeded 95 
percent of the loan rate, storage 
payments were stopped and were not 
resumed until 90 days after the price fell 
below 95 percent of the loan rate. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the three FOR 
prices and the annual average farm price 
for corn and wheat during the FOR's 
existence. The annual average corn price 
exceeded the release price only once, in 
1980. In 1983, the combination of the 
payment-in-kind (PIK) program and a 
drought drove average farm prices 
nearly to the release price. The annual 
average corn price never exceeded the 
call price. However, market prices did 
exceed the call price on several 
occasions. Average farm prices fell 
below the loan rate in 1981, 1982, 1985, 
and 1986. For wheat, the average farm 
price hovered around the release price in 
1978–80 and 1987–88. But in the 
intervening years, farm prices remained 
around the loan rate. 
 
The amount of grain stored under 
the FOR varied dramatically over the 
period. Figure 3 shows the annual FOR 
stocks for corn and wheat. For corn, the 
FOR stock levels went through several 
peaks and valleys. In 1979, the FOR 
held 670 million bushels of corn. By 
1980, these stocks had disappeared. 
Over the next two years, FOR corn 
stocks grew to 1.89 billion bushels. FOR 
corn stocks then fell to 389 million 
bushels in 1984, only to rise again to 
1.50 billion bushels in 1986. By 1991, 
the FOR corn stocks were again 
depleted. 
 
The swings in the FOR wheat stocks 
were not quite as dramatic. From 1979 to 
1982, FOR wheat stocks nearly 
quadrupled in size, from 260 million 
bushels to 1.06 billion bushels. In 1983, 
stocks fell to 600 million bushels and 
remained near that level until 1986. 
After 1986, FOR stocks gradually 
declined to zero. The surge in both corn 
and wheat FOR stocks from 1980 to 
1982 can be attributed to several factors, 
including the higher loan rates for FOR 
loans, the waiver of interest charges 
during the 1980 grain embargo, and the 
increase in the number of eligible 
producers over the period. 
 
Lessons Learned from the FOR 
and Other Commodity Programs 
Lesson 1. Government stocks substitute 
for private stocks. 
Advocates of the FOR note that it 
was a successful program that 
accomplished its primary objectives of 
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price stabilization because stocks 
increased in times of surplus production 
and decreased in times of shortages. 
Most studies of the FOR found that 
while the FOR did indeed increase 
stocks, the increase was less than that 
suggested by a simple examination of 
stock levels as the FOR decreased 
private stock holding. That is, if the FOR 
had never existed, private stocks would 
have built up before 1983 and 1988, 
partially offsetting the price impact of 
these short crop years.  
 
That the private sector would have 
increased stocks before the 1983 and 
1988 droughts is indicated by the large 
increase in corn and wheat stocks since 
1996. As discussed in the introduction, 
the government is no longer a large 
player in the stock holding business so 
most of the current grain stocks are held 
on farms and by commercial buyers. As 
shown in Figure 4, stock-to-use ratios 
have grown substantially since 1996 for 
corn and wheat. The ratios do not 
approach the record high levels of 1987, 
but nobody is advocating a return to 
1987 stock levels. Before we return to 
government-subsidized storage, we need 
to determine that the amount of private 
storage is inadequate.  
 
Lesson 2. It is difficult to release grain 
when prices are high. 
When prices are low, it is easy to 
implement a program that increases 
price by taking grain off the market. It is 
much more difficult to release grain 
when prices are high. Grain farmers who 
have a crop to sell when the price is high 
object to a government program that 
lowers the price they receive. But 
running a price stabilization program 
rather than a price enhancement program 
means lowering the price when the price 
is high.  
 
The solution to this political 
problem is to design program rules that 
automatically release grain when prices 
rise. The FOR had rules that stopped 
subsidies when prices rose and required 
release of grain when prices were above 
the call prices. But even automatic rules 
are subject to discretion. For example, 
loan rates should have declined in 2000 
because of an automatic rule that tied 
loan rates to market prices. The rule was 
passed because Congress did not want 
the government price to unduly 
influence planting decisions. But in 
February, the USDA announced that 
they would not allow loan rates to drop. 
Thus, we have record soybean acreage 
and a near-record corn crop in 2000.  
 
Because of political pressures, what 
may start as a price stabilization program 
can be expected to turn into a price 
enhancement program. Experience 
shows that increasing government 
involvement in grain storage will lead to 
stock levels that have often been 
described as “burdensome.” Large 
stocks are a burden to producers because 
their presence puts a cap on price rallies 
in the market. And taxpayers are 
burdened by large stocks because they 
have to pay to maintain them. 
 
Lesson 3. It is difficult to run a multi-
crop stabilization policy over time.  
Advocates of a return to government-
subsidized storage implicitly believe that 
the USDA economists are better able to 
guide commodity markets than the 
private sector. A successful stabilization 
program with an objective of stabilizing 
prices at long-run equilibrium levels 
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must first determine the target price 
levels. If targeted price levels are set too 
low, then the government program will 
be irrelevant because market prices will 
be above the intervention price. A more 
likely scenario is that targeted price 
levels will be set too high, which would 
cause stocks to accumulate dramatically 
over time.  
 
This problem of setting target prices 
is made more difficult when several 
crops are involved. Producers will tend 
to plant the crop with the highest relative 
price. The relatively high soybean loan 
rate is one cause for the dramatic 
increase in soybean acreage and a 
decline in wheat acreage. 
 
Another difficulty is that over time, 
the relative cost of producing crops will 
change because technology has 
differential affects on crops. For 
example, the cost of producing soybeans 
relative to corn in nontraditional soybean 
producing areas has declined as new 
weed control technologies have emerged 
and as plant breeders have tailored 
varieties for new growing regions. This 
decline in relative production cost is 
another reason why soybean acreage has 
increased recently. A well-run 
stabilization program would need to 
reflect this decrease in production costs 
when setting target prices, so that the 
program would not influence farmers’ 
planting decisions. 
Concluding Remarks  
Calls for a return to government-
subsidized storage are understandable in 
these times of low grain prices. After all, 
increased storage would increase market 
prices, at least in the short run. But if the 
objective of subsidized storage is price 
stability and not short-run price 
enhancement, then advocates need to 
examine how past storage programs 
have been run, and determine whether 
the current policy situation would 
actually be improved by a return to 
government-sponsored storage.  
 
Advocates of price stability need to 
determine that first, current stockholding 
activities by the private sector are 
inadequate. Second, they need to come 
up with a program design that is immune 
from political meddling so that the 
stabilization program does not turn into a 
price-enhancement program. Third, they 
need to determine methods for setting 
and updating program price levels that 
do not affect planting allocations. 
 
Ultimately, Congress will have to 
decide whether government-subsidized 
storage is in the nation’s best interest. 
From a public policy perspective, the 
relevant question is whether a return to 
government storage would lead to a 
better outcome for the United States than 
the current program that relies primarily 
on private storage. Only if the answer is 
a clear yes, should such a program be 
enacted. 
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Figure 1.  Annual Corn Prices
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Figure 2.  Annual Wheat Prices
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Figure 3.  Farmer-Owned Reserve Stocks
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Figure 4.  Is Private Storage Inadequate?
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